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FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MEXICO'S EXCHANGE-RATE CRISIS OF 1994
by
Polly Reynolds Allen
The University of Connecticut
In December 1994 Mexico's exchange-rate crisis sharply
reversed seven years of slow growth. With hindsight and
additional information, Mexico's large current-account deficit
and excessive reliance on short-term dollar-denominated borrowing
were clear signs of an overvalued peso. The suddenness and
severity of the crisis are harder to explain. Economists have
difficulty in modeling the precise timing of the crisis (Obstfeld
and Rogoff 1995 and Flood, Garber, and Kramer 1995). In general,
models of short-run movements in nominal exchange rates have not
been supported empirically (Meese and Rogoff 1983 and De Grauwe
1989). More remarkable in the case of Mexico, economists could
not agree in the months before the crisis on a fundamental
diagnosis of Mexico's exchange-rate policy (Dornbusch and Werner
1994).
The crisis followed a seven-year period of widely praised
reforms by the Mexican government. Aspe (1993) describes
Mexico's program for bringing down inflation, which had peaked at
almost 600 per cent per year in one month of 1987. Mexico
rejected the standard neoclassical prescription of contractionary
monetary and fiscal policies in favor of a program of structural
reforms, including liberalization and reform of the financial
markets, trade liberalization culminating with NAFTA,
privatization of state-owned industries, and tax and fiscal
reforms. At the core of the program was a series of Pacts among
business, labor, agriculture and the government to control wages
and prices and to stabilize the nominal exchange rate. Inflation
fell from 160 per cent per year in 1987 to 45 per cent in 1988
and to less than 20 per cent in subsequent years.
A key factor in the Pacts was the promise of limited and
controlled nominal depreciation of the peso against the dollar,
cumulatively totalling 56 per cent from 1988 to November 1994,
far short of Mexico's cumulative price increases of some 250 per
cent. Dornbusch and Werner (1994), measuring Mexico's real
exchange rate in several ways, show a real appreciation of the
peso from 1987-1993 in the range of 60 to 80 per cent. This
appreciation occurred in spite of a 14 per cent fall in Mexico's
terms of trade, a large component of the real exchange rate.
Mexico also ran overall balance-of-payments surpluses from 199093, accumulating over $7 b. of reserves in 1993 alone. Left to
the markets, the real appreciation would have been even greater.
Then, in 1994, increased concern about Mexico's political
situation reduced capital inflows, leading to large reserve
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losses. In December, the government devalued, stimulating
further speculation that sent the peso into a free-fall.
Eight months before the crisis, Dornbusch and Werner
summarized the opposing views of economists. On one side, the
"equilibrium view" maintained that Mexico's investment
opportunities, increased productivity, fiscal restraint, and
newly liberalized trade and capital flows justified the
continuing real appreciation. On the opposite side, Dornbusch
and Werner argued that the rising current-account deficit, slow
growth of output, and real appreciation relative to purchasing
power parity showed an increasingly overvalued peso. As it
turned out, they were correct about the overvaluation, and their
model of an incomes policy provides insight into Mexico's growing
disequilibrium.
But purchasing power parity is not an adequate measure of
the equilibrium real exchange rate, which is influenced by real
fundamentals. Yet fundamental changes of increased investment
and government saving suggested to those holding the "equilibrium
view" that Mexico's real appreciation was sustainable.
The fundamentals are crucial, but need to be analyzed in the
context of a credible model describing the interrelated
trajectories of the equilibrium real exchange rate and other
variables, such as output, investment, consumption, and saving.
For a country where capital moves freely, the model must
incorporate fundamental determinants of long-term capital flows
and the influence of the country's changing debt to foreigners.
The simple, dynamic neoclassical model I describe here emphasizes
the roles of investment, saving, and long-term capital flows in
determining an economy's equilibrium trajectory. The resulting
equilibrium real exchange rate is labeled the NATREX--the
NATural
Real EXchange rate.
If prices of goods are flexible and net capital flows
largely reflect long-term investment and lending, market
pressures will move the real exchange rate toward its equilibrium
trajectory, regardless of nominal exchange rate policy. But when
a country controls prices (as Mexico did, through the Pacts), the
lack of price flexibility can prevent the real exchange rate from
moving toward equilibrium. Equally important in Mexico's case,
large short-term net capital flows can distort the balance of
payments away from a sustainable equilibrium trajectory.
Pressures can build, eventually leading to a crisis. Knowledge
of the fundamentals and the corresponding equilibrium trajectory
of the exchange rate become essential for sound policy.
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Before the crisis, a comparison of the Mexican economy's
trajectories with the equilibrium trajectories of the NATREX
model would have provided a warning of the underlying
disequilibrium and instability of Mexico's course. Since the
crisis, many economists (e.g., Feldstein 1995 and Summers 1995)
have noted Mexico's low saving rate and the implications for
Mexico's growth of such low saving. More important in explaining
Mexico's exhange-rate crisis were the dynamics of its national
saving rate, which fell from 18 per cent of GDP in 1988 to only
15 per cent in 1992 and 1993. In addition to the positive
fundamentals of Mexico's reforms, such as growing investment and
increased government saving, Mexicans were borrowing to finance
almost twice as much consumption as investment.
The NATREX model provides a theoretical foundation for
describing an economy's equilibrium responses to changes in
saving and in investment. For countries with fairly flexible
prices, NATREX models have provided encouraging empirical support
for movements of real exchange rates in response to changes in
real fundamentals (Crouhy-Veyrac and Saint Marc 1995, Lim and
Stein 1995, Stein 1995a and Stein 1995b, and Stein and
Sauernheimer, 1995). But the changes in Mexico's investment,
saving, current account, and real exchange rate are inconsistent
with the equilibrium trajectories of the NATREX model. For
Mexico, the NATREX model is useful, not as a picture of what
actually happened, but to identify the fundamental problems-increased borrowing from foreigners in the face of declining
national saving, exacerbated by an overvalued and appreciating
real exchange rate. The dynamics of Mexico's rapidly falling
saving, increasing borrowing, and appreciating real exchange
rate--clear signs of an unstable trajectory--were the underlying
cause of Mexico's exchange rate crisis.
A SIMPLE NATREX MODEL
The NATREX model is a real, medium-run to long-run model
with high capital mobility, in which the goods market is cleared
by the real exchange rate. Investment and capital flows lead to
changes in the stocks of capital and net foreign debt, which in
turn influence the demand and supply for goods. The equilibrium
real exchange rate (the NATREX), continually clearing the market
for goods in the medium run, gradually evolves until the economy
reaches a steady state, where the stocks of capital and debt (per
unit of effective labor) are constant. For simplicity, consider
here the case of a stationary economy with zero growth.
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The real exchange rate, R, is defined as the foreigncurrency price of domestic currency, E, multiplied by the ratio
of domestic to foreign price levels, P/P* (GDP deflators),
(1) R = EP/P*,
a rise in R indicating real appreciation of the currency. The
asterisk denotes foreign variables. Define the price levels as
(2) P = P

a
n

P 2 b P 1 (1-a-b) and (2') P* = P n * a* P 1 * b* P 2 * (1-a*-b*) ,

where good n is nontradeable, good 1 is exported and good 2 is
imported by the home country. Assuming the law of one price for
tradeable goods,
(3) P 1 E = P 1 *, and (3') P 2 E = P 2 *,
the real exchange rate for the home country can be written as
a geometric average of the relative price of nontradeables to
exportables in each country, R n and R n *, and the home country's
terms of trade, T:
(1a) R = R

a
n

R n * a* T (1-b-b*) = zR n a

where R n = P n /P 1 , R n * = P n */P 2 *, T = P 1 /P 2 , and z = R n * a* T (1-b-b*) .
This general formulation for the real exchange rate (Allen 1995)
allows for the effects of changes in the relative prices of
nontradeables to tradeables and in the terms of trade. It can be
applied to a variety of models, and is empirically measurable.
The model describes a hypothetical medium-run equilibrium,
where output is at its natural level and the basic balance of
payments is in equilibrium. Cyclical, speculative, and short-run
expectational factors are played out in the medium run and are
ignored. Stocks of capital and net foreign debt are held
constant in the adjustment to this medium-run equilibrium, but
then begin to change as a result of investment and capital flows.
Since changing stocks of capital and foreign debt continue to
alter market equilibrium, the NATREX is a moving equilibrium real
exchange--an equilibrium trajectory rather than level.
The basic NATREX model can be summarized in three equations
--a medium-run market clearing equation (4) and dynamic equations
for the stocks of capital and foreign debt, eqs. (5) and (6).
All stocks and flows are written in terms of the export good 1.
Market equilibrium requires that national investment, I, minus
national saving, S, plus the current account, CA, sum to zero.
(4) I - S + CA = 0.

1
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The current account responds to changes in the real exchange
rate, declining with real appreciation. Equilibrium is achieved
through adjustments in the real exchange rate, which bring the
current-account deficit (-CA) to equal the difference between
national investment and national saving (I-S).
Assuming that the securities markets clear and that central
banks do not intervene in the foreign-exchange market in the
medium run, eq. (4) can be read either as zero excess demand for
goods or as basic balance-of-payments equilibrium, where the
current account is offset by non-speculative long-term net
capital flows. National investment and national saving include
both public and private flows, no distinction being made between
public and private.
Perfect long-term capital mobility assures that the country
can borrow freely at r* +
ρ--the world real long-term interest
rate, r*, plus an exogenous risk premium,
ρ. Behaviors of both
investors and consumers are derived from optimizing behavior
based on all current information, but without perfect foresight.
Given the uncertainty of future real disturbances, the
trajectory of the real exchange rate cannot be predicted, even
when the underlying structure of the model is known. Market
participants know that the real exchange rate will change but
cannot--and do not--predict its trajectory. As a consequence,
long-term capital mobility equates the domestic with the foreign
long-term real interest rate, adjusted for the risk premium.
The remaining two, dynamic equations describe the
trajectories of the capital stock and net debt to foreigners.
Desired national investment, I, leads to changes in the capital
stock, k, while desired net capital inflows, I-S, lead to changes
in the net debt to foreigners, F.
(5)

= I, = 0 in the steady state, and

(6)

= I-S , = 0 in the steady state.

In any medium run, the desired rates of saving, investment
and the current account depend on the levels of k and F, given
exogenous factors such as the level of productivity, the rate of
time preference, the world rate of interest, the risk premium,
and the terms of trade. Net long-term capital inflows (I-S>0),
lead to increases in the foreign debt, F, which affects both
saving and the current account. Positive investment (I>0) raises
the capital stock, k, which influences all three flows-investment, saving and the current account. An exogenous

6
increase in productivity of capital, u, increases investment,
while an exogenous increase in time preference,
σ, increases
consumption and reduces saving. A rise in r*+
ρ reduces
investment. The real exchange rate, R, affects only the current
account, a rise in R (real appreciation) reducing a current2
account surplus or increasing a deficit.
The model is described
in more detail in the Appendix.
The three basic equations become
- + ? + - ? - - (4a) I(k;u,r*+ ρ) - S(k,F; σ) + CA(R,k,F;u, σ,T) = 0,
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(5a)

- + = I(k;u,r*+ ρ), = 0 in the steady state,

(6a)

- + ? + = I(k;u,r*+ ρ) - S(k,F; σ), = 0 in the steady state.

Saving equals GNP (output minus interest payments to foreigners)
minus consumption,
+
+ +
(7) S = y(k) - [r*+ ρ]F - C(k-F; σ),

S F = -(r*+ ρ) + C w ,

where wealth w = k-F.
Stability requires that a rising capital stock gradually
decrease investment (I k <0) and that rising foreign debt gradually
increase saving (S F >0) and so reduce borrowing.
FUNDAMENTAL DISTURBANCES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND TIME PREFERENCE
The NATREX approach is designed to show (i) how fundamental
changes in desired net capital flows influence the equilibrium
real exchange rate and (ii) how an increase of borrowing leads to
different trajectories for the equilibrium real exchange rate,
depending whether the country borrows to finance new investment
or new consumption. Borrowing for either purpose leads in the
medium run to real appreciation and then to rising debt, but only
investment increases the capital stock. Changes in both debt and
the capital stock affect market equilibrium and the trajectory
and long-run change of the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Borrowing to finance consumption leads ultimately to lower
consumption and real depreciation, whereas borrowing to finance
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investment leads eventually to higher output, greater consumption
and, likely, long-run real appreciation.
Figure 1a graphs desired long-term capital inflows, I-S, and
the current-account deficit, -CA, in relation to the real
exchange rate, R. The real exchange rate has no effect on either
investment or saving, but positively affects the current-account
deficit. In medium-run equilibrium, eq. (4a), long-term net
capital inflows equal the current-account deficit, whereas longrun equilibrium (in an economy with no growth) requires zero
capital flows and a balanced current account. Starting at point
a (in long-run equilibrium where I-S = -CA = 0), increased
borrowing for any purpose will raise I-S, shifting the I-S curve
right to (I-S)'; use of the newly borrowed funds to purchase
imports shifts -CA to the right as well, to -CA'. To the extent
that the newly borrowed funds are used for domestic goods, I-S >
-CA at R 0 , and the economy moves to point
b. The real exchange
rate appreciates in the medium run to R 1 .
[Figure 1 about here.]
This medium-run real appreciation occurs, regardless why the
country borrows. Stocks of capital or debt then begin to grow,
influencing I-S and -CA and changing the equilibrium exchange
rate. The NATREX is a moving equilibrium.
Borrowing to finance consumption.
When the country is borrowing to finance consumption (caused
by a rise in time preference,
σ, which reduces saving in favor of
consumption), foreign debt starts rising. With the capital stock
unaffected, wealth (k-F) gradually falls, and interest payments
to foreigners, r*F, rise.
The stability requirement of S F > 0 requires that
consumption respond strongly and positively to changes in wealth.
Rising foreign debt reduces wealth and increases interest
payments to foreigners. Saving will rise in response, only if
consumption declines more rapidly than the rise of interest
payments.
In figure 1a, with rising F, the I-S curve slowly shifts
back to the left, until net capital inflows have ceased at I-S =
0. The rise in the foreign debt also increases the currentaccount deficit, moving the -CA curve right to -CA". With
increased interest payments to foreigners, the current account
will balance in the steady state only with a trade surplus,
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requiring a real depreciation. The economy moves gradually from
b to c, with depreciation from R 1 to R 2 .
In the new steady state, wealth has declined and consumption
4
has fallen below its pre-disturbance level.
Borrowing to
finance consumption is truly a shift of time preference in a
stable economy. Higher consumption today must be offset with
lower consumption in the future. In summary,
borrowing to finance increased consumption first leads to real
appreciation. In a stable economy, saving will then rise in
response to the rising debt, leading to an eventual decline
of
consumption and real depreciation.
Borrowing to finance investment.
We see a different set of trajectories and long-run
outcomes, when the country borrows to finance new investment (due
to a rise in productivity, u, raising the marginal product of
capital). This investment increases both the capital stock and
foreign debt, eqs. (5) and (6), producing a more complex
trajectory for the NATREX. Before predicting the trajectory of
R, we need to know what goods are produced and traded, which
goods are capital goods, and in which industry productivity
increases.
For Mexico, let us take the case of a small country,
producing two kinds of goods: tradeable goods, t = 1,2, sold at
world prices, and nontradeable goods, n. The terms of trade,
determined by world prices (T = P 1 */P 2 *), are exogenous. Only
the relative price of nontradeables, R n , is endogenous, adjusting
to medium-run equilibrium and providing the endogenous adjustment
in the NATREX. In eq. (1a), percentage changes in R are
proportional to percentage changes in R n , assuming R n * and T to
be constant.
With the tradeables markets always clearing at world prices,
the trade balance, B, equals the country's excess supply of
tradeables goods,
(7) B = y

t

- E t,

where E t = is expenditure for tradeables for either investment or
consumption and y t is output of tradeables. Any excess demand
for goods must come from nontradeables. From the nationalincome-accounting definitions and eq. (7), eq. (4) can be
rewritten as
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(4b) I - S + CA = E - y + B

= E

n

= E

t

+ E n - y t -y n + (y t - E t )

? - - + +
+ + - y n = E n (k,F,Rn;u t ,σ) - y n (k,Rn;u t ) = 0,

where E denotes investment plus consumption expenditure for all
goods, E n , expenditure for good n, and y n , output of good n; when
describing only the tradeables industry, the productivity
parameter is u t . Fig. 1b shows the basic market equation,
written as the excess demand for nontradeables. For a small
country facing fixed world prices of tradeables, equations (4a)
and (4b), or figures 1a and 1b, are two ways of looking at the
same market-clearing condition.
In fig. 1a, the real exchange rate appreciates to R
1 because
of increased demand for domestic goods (I-S > -CA); in fig. 1b,
the same increased demand is shown as a rightward shift of E
n to
E n '. When capital inflows finance new investment, the initial
rise in demand and shift of E n (δE n /δu t > 0) reflects new demand
for nontradeable capital goods, such as construction.
The subsequent trajectory of the NATREX depends in which
industry productivity has increased. Let us assume for Mexico
that the increase of productivity occurs only in the tradeables
industries. New investment in tradeables leads to increased
output of tradeables, y t , and to increased demand for labor by
the tradeables industry. As labor, and possibly capital, are
shifted from production of nontradeables into production of
tradeables, output of nontradeables declines (
δy n /δu t < 0,
gradually). In fig. 1b, the y n curve gradually shifts left to
y n '. On the demand side, investment spending for nontradeables
declines as the capital stock rises (until it eventually reaches
zero in the steady state), while consumption of nontradeables
begins to rise with rising wealth; the long-run effect on demand
for nontradeables is shown as a shift from E
The
n ' to E n ".
economy gradually moves to point
d, with a long-run appreciation
of the NATREX to R 3 . (Though not shown in fig. 1a, I-S returns
to zero and the -CA curve gradually shifts left from -CA' to
5
intersect with I-S at an exchange rate of R
3 .)
The increased productivity in tradeables has lead to longrun real appreciation. (The new steady-state NATREX, R
3 , is
probably lower than the medium-run R 1 , and the move from R 1 to R 3
may not be monotonic.)
As long as the marginal product of capital is greater than
the real interest rate (y' > r* +
ρ), the new investment will
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raise the capital stock more than the debt, implying a rise in
wealth and leading to increased consumption. (A sufficiently
large marginal product of capital [y' > C
w ] will cause output and
saving to rise so much, that the country will not only increase
consumption but also repay the debt and start lending [dF/du <
0].) In summary,
borrowing to finance investment first induces real
appreciation. Investment in the tradeables industry leads
to appreciation also in the long run. Gradually, output,
wealth and consumption will rise.
Table 1 summarizes the medium-run and lo
ng-run effects of
the two types of borrowing on the NATREX, output, wealth,
consumption, and saving.
Neither disturbance produces a
continual decline of saving. In response to a rise in time
preference, we see a decline of saving, rise of consumption and
appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange occurring together
in the medium run, but are only temporarily; with stable
adjustment, all three are then reversed. An increase of
investment leads to a positive cumulation of savings over time .
[Table 1 about her e.]
Comparing these trajectories of the NATREX model with those
observed for Mexico from 1988-1993 highlights the real
fundamentals that lead to Mexico's exchange-rate crisis in 1994.
EVIDENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL DISEQUILIBRIUM IN MEXICO
Table 2 shows Mexico's balance of payments from 1988 through
the third quarter of 1994. The current-account deficit had grown
to 8 per cent of GDP by 1992. Foreign direct investment remained
fairly steady, at only one to two per cent of GDP, slightly less
than the increase of reserves for 1990-93. Almost 90 per cent of
the net foreign investment from 1988-1993 was in the form of
portfolio investment, much of it short-term and indexed to the
dollar. Reserve inflows turned negative in 1994, with capital
inflows falling sharply in the second quarter.
[Table 2 about here.]
To see whether net foreign investment (NFI) in Mexico
financed new investment or new consumption, we can look at the
changes in national investment and national saving that
accompanied the current-account deficit, keeping in mind that NFI
= -CA = I-S. Table 3 shows the ratios to GDP of Mexico's
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national investment (I/GDP), national saving (S/GDP), and
current-account deficit (-CA/GDP), and the year-to-year changes
in these three ratios, for the period 1988-1993. The sum of the
decreases in S/GDP for 1988-1993 totaled .058, almost exactly
equal to the changes in private consumption, while the sum of the
increases of I/GDP totaled only .027. Year-to-year increases in
national consumption total over twice the increases in
investment. Cumulatively, from 1988-1993, about 60 per cent of
the new borrowing (above 1987 levels) financed increased
consumption.
[Table 3 about here.]
Comparing these Mexican trajectories with those of the
NATREX model, we must keep in mind that Mexico's economy did not
meet the medium-run assumptions of the NATREX model in several
ways. Prices were largely regulated through the Pacts, leaving
output to clear the goods market and requiring foreign-exchange
intervention to maintain the nominal exchange rate. Net foreign
lending included a large short-term component, reflecting
excessive and risky intermediation by Mexico's newly privatized
banks. And desired lending from abroad was not perfectly elastic
at an exogenous r* + ρ; foreigners' willingness to lend
reflected a number of factors, which can be summarized in a
fluctuating risk premium,
ρ.
The real appreciation of the peso and inflows of reserves,
simultaneous with a growing current-account deficit in Mexico,
imply that disturbances came primarily from the capital account.
The "equilibrium view" held that reform, liberalization, and
rising productivity led to higher investment in Mexico and
increased supplies of funds from foreigners.
By itself, an increase of funds from abroad would lead to a
fall in the risk premium, real appreciation, and a greater
current-account deficit. Investment should rise with the lower
cost of borrowing, but there is no guarantee that the investment
increases will equal the increase in the current-account deficit.
To the extent that investment did not increase as much the
desired new lending from foreigners, with prices rigid, the
contractionary effects of the real appreciation would reduce
output and lower saving. (This short-run response is not
considered in the medium-run NATREX model; in this case, with a
decline of saving due to falling income, the new borrowing would
be financing existing consumption.) An exogenous increase of
productivity in addition (a possible cause of foreigners'
enthusiasm to lend) would further increase investment, shifting
the use of funds away from consumption to investment.
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But the Mexican figures do not support this "equilibrium"
interpretation. Consumption (primarily private consumption) grew
twice as fast as investment. The primary underlying cause of
Mexico's increased borrowing, rising current-account deficit and
real appreciation of the peso was the rapid rise in national
consumption and corresponding fall in national saving. Compared
with the stable trajectories described by the NATREX model, this
continued steady decline of saving accompanied by increased
borrowing indicates an economy on an unsustainable, fundamentally
unstable path.
Figure 2 illustrates Mexico's move away from equilibrium.
At point b in fig. 2 (as in fig. 1a), the country is shown with a
current-account deficit and net capital inflow equal to 0A. (In
a stable economy the I-S curve would gradually shift back to I-S,
and if the country were borrowing to finance consumption, the
exchange rate would gradually depreciate to a level, not shown in
fig. 2, below R 0 .) In Mexico, however, we see the opposite
movements: saving continues to fall, moving the I-S curve from
(I-S)' to (I-S)" and and the -CA curve to -CA". The NATREX
appreciates further, from R 1 to R 2 at point c. Although market
flows called for the real appreciation of the peso through 1993,
these market flows reflected unstable consumption behavior and
unsustainable short-term foreign lending. The economy was on an
unstable trajectory.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In 1994, world markets became less willing to lend to
Mexico, raising the risk premium. Figure 2 shows the results of
this rise in ρ as a leftward shift of the I-S curve back to
I-S = 0, and a depreciation of the real exchange rate to R
3 , at
point d. The reactions of market participants to the rising risk
premium, depreciation of the peso, and new perceptions of
Mexico's unstable trajectory contained a large destabilizing
speculative element. Only the large loans and loan guarantees
from the US and the IMF prevented net capital flows from
foreigners from turning strongly negative.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) discuss the credibility of th
e
Mexican policies, as measured by the interest-rate differentials
on dollar-denominated and peso-denominated Mexican bonds (proxies
for the markets' expectations of depreciation). They do not
discuss the necessary underlying basis for credibility.
Credibility is not simply a matter of image manipulation but
rather of assuring the underlying fundamentals. While the NATREX
model does not explain the precise timing, it demonstrates the

13
inevitability of the crisis, given the fundamentally unstable
trajectory of the Mexican economy.
CONCLUSION
The NATREX model shows how productivity, u
t , time
preference, σ, and the terms of trade, T, influence the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate R s .

(8) R

s

+ - +
= R (u t , σ, T).
s

In Mexico from 1988-1994, cumulative declines of saving
equaling almost twice the increases of investment, combined with
slow growth of output, suggest that Mexico's borrowing was
induced by increases more of time preference than of
productivity. While both kinds of borrowing lead to initial real
appreciation, borrowing to finance consumption quickly begins to
depreciate the NATREX. Mexico's 70 per-cent real appreciation of
the actual real exchange rate over the period indicates
increasing misalignment from the equilibrium rate. Moreover, the
14 per-cent decline in the terms of trade directly depreciated
the NATREX, making even greater the misalignment from the real
appreciation.
Not only did Mexico have an overvalued exchange rate. The
underlying fundamentals governing Mexico's national consumption
and national saving were unstable. Mexico's slowly growing
output barely covered the small increases in government
consumption. The soaring private consumption was financed by
borrowing from foreigners.
The NATREX model shows why a country cannot continue
borrowing to finance consumption, even with perfect capital
mobility. A stable economy requires that debt-financed new
consumption must be followed by increased saving and lower
consumption in the future. 7 This conclusion comes from an
intertemporal budget constraint, not of zero present value for
debt, but more practically, of movement to a sustainable level of
debt to foreigners. Any country that continually borrows to
finance consumption (at a rate exceeding the growth of output) is
on an unstable trajectory that cannot be maintained indefinitely.
If the markets for a time ignore this instability and continue
to lend without raising the risk premium, the short-run marketclearing real exchange rate will appreciate ever farther from an
equilibrium trajectory.
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This unstable scenario of borrowing ever more to finance
consumption describes Mexico's situation from 1988-1994. Not
until 1994 did the markets begin to bet on a depreciation of the
peso. The turn-around in capital flows was sparked by increased
political uncertainties in Mexico and rising world interest
rates, more than by any sudden perception from the markets of
Mexico's unstable economic trajectory. But an increase of the
risk premium, reduction of borrowing and real depreciation of the
peso were consistent with the fundamentals for Mexico.
In the perfect world of the NATREX models, where the economy
is always in medium-run equilibrium, unexpected real disturbances
continually change the trajectory and steady-state level of the
NATREX, so that it is always moving toward, but never reaches,
its steady-state level. In the real world, where rigid prices,
short-run speculative capital flows, and other market
imperfections prevent the economy from reaching medium-run
equilibrium, the actual real exchange rate deviates from the
NATREX. But if prices are responsive to market pressures, the
real exchange rate will continually be adjusting toward its
moving equilibrium trajectory. The NATREX approach points up the
basic fundamentals that determine this equilibrium trajectory and
the inevitable pressures to move the real exchange rate toward
the NATREX trajectory, regardless of nominal exchange-rate
policy.
However, in countries where price rigidities prevent the
economy from adjusting, the real exchange rate will not
automatically move toward its NATREX trajectory. The nominal
exchange rate becomes an increasingly important factor in
determining the real exchange rate, and the choice of the nominal
rate makes a real difference. Policy makers and participants in
the markets need to know the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Knowing the equilibrium real exchange rate precisely is
impossible, for it is a moving equilibrium determined by everchanging fundamentals. Using purchasing power parity as a
measure of equilibrium is inadequate. While purchasing power
parity remains the benchmark around which exchange rates move
over very long periods of time, within relevant time horizons the
deviations of the equilibrium real exchange rate from PPP are
much too large to ignore. Policy makers need to be aware of the
interrelationship of the basic macroeconomic trajectories of
saving, investment, output, consumption, and capital flows and to
measure the effectiveness of their macroeconomic and exchangerate policies against these equilibrium trajectories. The NATREX
model provides a comprehensible picture of the equilibrium
macroeconomic trajectories, against which policy makers can
measure and evaluate the actual trajectories of the economy.
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Such an evaluation in Mexico in the e arly 1990s would have
shown the movements of all of the fundamentals, giving strong
warnings of problems ahead for a country borrowing to finance so
much new consumption. Increased borrowing to finance rising
consumption had placed the Mexican economy on an unstable
trajectory. That adjustment came only after several years of
falling saving made the correction all the more severe.
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ENDNOTES
1. A more detailed exposition of the NATREX approach can be
found in Stein, Allen et al. (1995, Chs. 1-3). The NATREX
approach encompasses several variations of the basic model,
adapted to meet the specific characterstics of the economy
described. Variations include alternative assumptions about what
goods are produced; whether they are consumer, capital or
intermediate goods; the degree of capital mobility; the rate of
growth of the economy; and how large the country is in various
markets, including the possibility of modeling interacting large
economies. But basic shape of the simple model presented here
and the major conclusions typify all NATREX models.
2. The assumption that I and S are independent of the real
exchange rate is a simplification, though probably not a serious
one. All flows are denominated here in terms of the export good,
so that a rise in the relative price of nontradeables, R
n (a
component of R), will increase the aggregate value of existing
flows, to the extent that nontradeables are produced or
purchased. In the case of aggregate output, a rise in R
n will
increase production of nontradeables as well as their value in
terms of the export good, so aggregate output is positively
related to R n . But substitutability between consumption goods
would shift consumption away from nontradeables in the event of a
rise in R n , so the effect on overall consumption is ambiguous,
depending on the elasticities of substitution. The effect of the
real exchange rate on investment is thoroughly ambiguous,
depending on which industry is the target of investment and which
good is the capital good. On balance, the assumption that both I
and I-S are independent of the real exchange rate is not
unreasonable, unless one is modelling a specific country where it
is possible to sign the direction of the influence.
3. CA F < 0 assumes that when F rises, the increase of
interest payments to foreigners exceeds the wealth effect on
imports of consumption goods.
4. The requirement that investment and capital flows be zero
in the steady state stems from the assumption, made purely for
expositional simplicity, of a non-growing stationary economy. If
the economy were growing at rate n, equal to the growth rate of
effective labor, then I = nk and I-S = nF in the steady state.
With sufficient growth, consumption might be higher in the steady
state than before the disturbance, but will always be lower than
if the rate of time preference had not increased.
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5. The argument that increased productivity in the
tradeables sector appreciates a country's real exchange rate has
traditionally been based on rising wages in both sectors (Balassa
1964, Samuelson 1964, and Bhagwati 1984). While this argument is
consistent with the response in the NATREX model, it does not
consider investment, net capital flows, or the change in debt,
leaves out the responses emphasized in the NATREX approach.
6. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) noted the correlation
between saving and investment across countries and took this
correlation as an indicator of low capital mobility, a point
reasserted by Feldstein (1995) this year with respect to Mexico.
Many economists have offered alternative explanations for the
correlation. The NATREX model shows that a high correlation
between national saving and national investment can be expected
for a stable economy, even in the presence of perfect capital
mobility.
7. Turner (1995) points out that, over the same period
considered here for Mexico, capital inflows to Latin America as a
whole financed increases of consumption rather than investment.
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1. A more detailed exposition of the NATREX approach can be found
in Stein, Allen et al. (1995, Chs. 1-3). The NATREX approach
encompasses several variations of the basic model, adapted to meet
the specific characterstics of the economy described. Variations
include alternative assumptions about what goods are produced;
whether they are consumer, capital or intermediate goods; the
degree of capital mobility; the rate of growth of the economy; and
how large the country is in various markets, including the
possibility of modeling interacting large economies. But basic
shape of the simple model presented here and the major conclusions
typify all NATREX models.
2. The assumption that I and S are independent of the real exchange
rate is a simplification, though probably not a serious one. All
flows are denominated here in terms of the export good, so that a
rise in the relative price of nontradeables, R
n (a component of R),
will increase the aggregate value of existing flows, to the extent
that nontradeables are produced or purchased. In the case of
aggregate output, a rise in R n will increase production of
nontradeables as well as their value in terms of the export good,
so aggregate output is positively related to R
But
n.
substitutability between consumption goods would shift consumption
away from nontradeables in the event of a rise in R
n, so the effect
on overall consumption is ambiguous, depending on the elasticities
of substitution. The effect of the real exchange rate on
investment is thoroughly ambiguous, depending on which industry is
the target of investment and which good is the capital good. On
balance, the assumption that both I and I-S are independent of the
real exchange rate is not unreasonable, unless one is modelling a
specific country where it is possible to sign the direction of the
influence.
3. CA F < 0 assumes that when F rises, the increase of interest
payments to foreigners exceeds the wealth effect on imports of
consumption goods.
4. The requirement that investment and capital flows be zero in the
steady state stems from the assumption, made purely for
expositional simplicity, of a non-growing stationary economy. If
the economy were growing at rate n, equal to the growth rate of
effective labor, then I = nk and I-S = nF in the steady state.
With sufficient growth, consumption might be higher in the steady
state than before the disturbance, but will always be lower than if
the rate of time preference had not increased.
5. The argument that increased productivity in the tradeables
sector appreciates a country's real exchange rate has traditionally
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been based on rising wages in both sectors (Balassa 1964, Samuelson
1964, and Bhagwati 1984). While this argument is consistent with
the response in the NATREX model, it does not consider investment,
net capital flows, or the change in debt, leaves out the responses
emphasized in the NATREX approach.
6. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) noted the correlation between
saving and investment across countries and took this correlation as
an indicator of low capital mobility, a point reasserted by
Feldstein (1995) this year with respect to Mexico. Many economists
have offered alternative explanations for the correlation. The
NATREX model shows that a high correlation between national saving
and national investment can be expected for a stable economy, even
in the presence of perfect capital mobility.
7. Turner (1995) points out that, over the same period considered
here for Mexico, capital inflows to Latin America as a whole
financed increases of consumption rather than investment.

